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In the literature on international monetary policy, the paradigm is that gains from
coordination are fairly small. Monetary policy is conducted to stabilize macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations and gains from policy coordination arise from preventing national monetary
authorities from strategically manipulating the terms of trade by means of these stabi-
lization policy instruments. However, as it has been emphasized by Lucas (2003), welfare
gains from stabilizing ﬂuctuations are generically small since they are of second order. In
this paper, I develop a dynamic stochastic two-country model with sticky wages and a
cash-in-advance restriction which is in the spirit of the New Open Economy Macroeco-
nomics framework. In this environment, monetary authorities can manipulate the terms
of trade by conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the nominal inter-
est rate and the money supply. The money supply aﬀects the terms of trade by altering
the nominal exchange rate ex post and it is used in the traditional way so as to stabi-
lize macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. The nominal interest rate aﬀects the terms of trade by
changing expected inﬂation ex ante. Self-oriented national policymakers use the nominal
interest rates to raise the terms of trade ex ante. This leads to an ineﬃcient inﬂation
tax whose welfare eﬀects are of ﬁrst order. Consequently, gains from monetary policy
coordination are of ﬁrst order.
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In the literature on the international dimension of monetary policy, the consensus is that
gains from policy coordination are fairly small. Monetary policy is considered to be
concerned with the stabilization of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations only. Gains from policy
coordination arise then from preventing strategic considerations regarding the use of these
stabilization policies from unilaterally manipulating the terms of trade. However, as it has
been emphasized by Lucas (2003), the gains from stabilizing macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
per se are generically quite limited. Instead, he argues that
”...there remain important gains in welfare ... from providing people with
better incentives to work and to save, not from better ﬁne tuning of spending
ﬂows.”
In this paper, I take up his proposition and translate it into the context of an open
economy. I demonstrate that gains from international monetary policy cooperation can
be substantial when policymakers coordinate on the stimulation of labor and hence pro-
duction rather than on the stabilization of exogenously driven ﬂuctuations. To this end,
I develop a simple dynamic stochastic two-country model with preset wages and cash-in-
advance restrictions. National monetary authorities can aﬀect the equilibrium allocation
in this environment by conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the
nominal interest rate as well as the money supply. On the one hand, the money supply
policy aﬀects the allocation by altering the nominal spending and thereby the nominal
exchange rate ex post. A contraction of money supply then leads to an appreciation of
the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade. This equips monetary authorities with
an eﬀective policy instrument to stabilize economic ﬂuctuations. On the other hand, the
nominal interest rate aﬀects the allocation by changing the expected inﬂation ex ante.
Because inﬂation works as a tax on labor income, higher expected inﬂation leads house-
holds to claim higher nominal wages. This results in an increase in the prices of goods
and thereby causes an appreciation of the terms of trade.1
Within this framework which allows the joint analysis of the nominal interest rate and
the money supply as combined tools of monetary policy, two important results emerge:
First, the equilibrium and hence welfare eﬀects of the nominal interest rate policy are
of ﬁrst order whereas those of the money supply management are of second order. The
intuition for this is simple: The money supply is eﬀective only because of sticky wages
through ex post deviations of the actual money supply from the expected one. Thus,
money supply management only aﬀects the variability of the equilibrium allocation. As a
result, the ex ante equilibrium eﬀects of money supply policies are thus of second order.
By contrast, the nominal interest rate changes the average labor supply and hence strikes
a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transforma-
tion. This ineﬃcient wedge is present irrespective of whether wages are ﬂexible or not
and irrespective of whether the state of the world is uncertain. Consequently, the equi-
librium implications are of ﬁrst order. Second, regarding the nominal interest rate policy,
1Within a closed economy model whose structure is similar to the present open economy model, Ireland
(1996) already argues that monetary policy can be conducted in a more general way by using both expected
money growth rate and deviations from the expected money growth rate. More recently, Adao et al. (2003) take
up his approach and analyze optimal short-run monetary policy in a closed economy real business cycle model
with monopolistic ﬁrms, a cash-in-advance restriction and preset prices. They, however, directly argue by means
of the nominal interest rate (implicitly controlled by the expected money growth rate) and the money supply
(ie. state-dependent deviations from the expected money growth rate). For reasons of economic intuition it
proves particularly useful to directly follow Adao et al. and refer to the two policy instruments as the nominal
interest rate and the money supply.1 INTRODUCTION 3
self-interested national policymakers indeed have an incentive to deviate from the globally
optimal nominal interest rate. From a global perspective, the Friedman rule is optimal
since it minimizes the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal
rate of transformation in all instances when wages are ﬂexible and at least on average when
wages are sticky. Independent and self-oriented national policymakers, however, strive for
an appreciation of the terms of trade in order to improve the domestic labor-leisure trade-
oﬀ in all instances when wages are ﬂexible and at least on average when wages are sticky.
As it is true for the money supply policy, deviations of nominal interest rates from the
globally optimal levels are always ”beggar-thy-neighbor”. The important conclusion to
be drawn then is that as long as monetary authorities face the incentive to depart from
the optimal monetary policy, gains from international arrangements or institutions that
eﬀectively prevent these strategic interactions are of ﬁrst order. A simple numerical ex-
ample demonstrates that international coordination of nominal interest rate policy can
amount to welfare gains four orders of magnitude larger than gains from coordinating
stabilization policies through money supply management. Consequently, potential gains
from policy coordination are not negligible.
The reason why it has become widely accepted that potential gains from policy coordi-
nations must be quite limited might be best understood when looking at the literature from
an historical perspective: Beginning with the seminal contributions by Hamada (1974,
1976, 1979), the ﬁrst generation of game-theoretic models - represented most prominently
by Oudiz and Sachs (1984), Rogoﬀ (1985), and Canzoneri and Gray (1985)2 - are based on
Old-Keynesian models where policymakers are assumed to minimize an ad hoc motivated
quadratic loss function that punishes deviations from given desired levels or blisspoints of
the inﬂation rate, the increase in international reserves, or the output level. These models
provide the theoretical rationale for international monetary policy coordination so as to
overcome global ineﬃciencies induced by strategic considerations of independent mone-
tary authorities. While there is no question about the merits of the aforementioned class
of models for the purpose of studying international policy coordination, the assumptions
of the policy objectives lead immediately to the result of limited gains for two reasons:
First, the quadratic loss function itself directly reduces the problem to the minimization
of ﬂuctuations around the blisspoints. The consequence is that gains from coordinating
monetary policy must be of second order. Second, these studies neglected the possibility
that the blisspoints themselves are subject to strategic considerations. As it is demon-
strated in this paper, the non-cooperatively set expected inﬂation rates and hence the
non-cooperatively set nominal interest rates diﬀer from the globally optimal one and they
hinge crucially on the macroeconomic interdependencies among the diﬀerent countries.
A consistent notion of the desired levels of inﬂation or output conditioning on the in-
ternational macroeconomic environment, however, necessarily requires a rigorous welfare
foundation.
Such welfare foundations were provided with the advent of the ”New Open Economy
Macroeconomics” (NOEM) that brought optimizing agents, monopolistic competition and
nominal rigidities into dynamic general equilibrium models.3 This New Keynesian frame-
work forms the basis of the second generation of policy coordination models as in Corsetti
2Cooper (1985), Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), and Persson and Tabellini (1995) present excellent
overviews of the ﬁrst generation literature.
3Seminal contributions to this literature are Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995, 1996). For an excellent survey see Lane (2001).1 INTRODUCTION 4
and Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a), and Devereux and Engel (2003).4 Nev-
ertheless, even though the second generation models provide new important insights to
the question of the needs of international policy coordination, the welfare gains are simi-
larly limited as in the ﬁrst generation models. In contrast to the ﬁrst generation models,
however, the answer to this problem is now inherent to the speciﬁcation of the conduct
of policy itself. In one prominent class of models, as for example in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2002a) and Devereux and Engel (2003), it is assumed that monetary authorities follow
policy rules that condition money supply deviations from any given initial stock of money
on the realization of shocks. The average inﬂation rate induced by the mean growth rate
of the money supply is implicitly assumed to be zero. In the other prominent class of mod-
els, as for example in Clarida et al. (2002) and Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005), it is assumed
that policymakers follow interest rate rules that condition on deviations of inﬂation rates
and output from some given reference levels. Equivalent to the problem of exogenous
blisspoints discussed above, both the average interest rate as well as the reference value
for the inﬂation and output deviations are not further analyzed but implicitly ﬁxed via
the (log)linear approximation of the model about a zero inﬂation and nonstrategic steady
state. Hence, in both classes of models, monetary policy solely focuses on stabilization
issues and consequently the welfare gains of policy coordination are of second order.
Surprisingly, there are only very few contributions that consider non-stabilizing mon-
etary policy interaction within a strategic setting. One exception is Cooley and Quadrini
(2003) who study optimal monetary policy in a two-country open economy model that is
not a variation of the NOEM framework. Instead, they use a limited participation ver-
sion where purchases of production intermediaries - partly imported - must be ﬁnanced
in advance. Consequently, the nominal interest rate has a distorting eﬀect as it increases
the cost of production. In this environment, self-interested monetary authorities face the
incentive to increase the nominal interest rate in order to appreciate the terms of trade
and thereby to expand domestic production. This leads to strategically induced inﬂa-
tionary biases with ineﬃciencies that have sizable adverse welfare consequences. Another
exception is Arseneau (2007) who studies the importance of the distortion caused by mo-
nopolistic competition for the optimal nominal interest rate policy. Similarly to the model
here, he motivates money demand within a version of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) by a
cash-in-advance restriction. He also demonstrates that non-cooperative monetary author-
ities use the nominal interest rate to induce a domestic appreciation of the terms of trade
that leads in equilibrium to sizable welfare losses as compared to the cooperative solution.
Arseneau, however, concentrates on the interaction between optimal interest rates and
the friction of monopolistic competition and thereby seeks to complement Cooley and
Quadrini (2003) where production takes place in a perfectly competitive environment.
In contrast, in the present paper, the generalization of monetary policy conduct in
an environment with nominal inertia facilitates the joint analysis of both the nominal
interest rate (or equivalently the average money growth rate) and the money supply man-
agement (or equivalently state-dependent deviations from the expected average money
growth rate). Consequently, the model proposed below which is kept close to Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2002a) and which is hence in the tradition of the NOEM literature provides a
4Other contributions include Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2005, 2006), Clarida et al. (2002), Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005), Corsetti et al. (2000), Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) Kollmann (2003), Liu and Pappa (2005), Pappa
(2004), and Tchakarov (2004). Canzoneri et al. (2005), who introduces the above distinction between ﬁrst and
second generation models of international policy coordination, survey the literature and discuss the properties
of the second generation models in general.2 THE MODEL 5
unifying framework that allows the derivation of more general principles of optimal mon-
etary policy conduct in open economies.
The model is presented in the next Section. In Section 3, the equilibrium allocation is
derived for both ﬂexible wage and sticky wage environments. In Section 4, I explore the
national equilibrium welfare as the policymakers’ objectives in detail and demonstrate
that the welfare consequences of nominal interest rate policy are indeed of ﬁrst order
whereas the welfare consequences of stabilizing money supply management are of second
order. The analysis of optimal monetary policy when set cooperatively and independently
follow in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. A numerical example in Section 7 provides an
assessment of the quantitative relevance of the ﬁndings. Section 8 concludes. Most of
the derivations of the equations and the results are delegated to an Appendix which is
available upon request.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of two identical countries which are denoted Home (H) and
Foreign (F). Each country is populated by a continuum of households and both countries
are of equal size one. Firms within a country produce two diﬀerent consumption goods, one
traded good that is demanded across borders, and one non-traded good that is demanded
only within borders. In all there are thus four diﬀerent goods. The goods markets are
assumed to be perfectly competitive and goods price are fully ﬂexible. The only productive
factor is diﬀerentiated labor. Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a speciﬁc type
of labor and it is identiﬁed by superscript i. 5
Firms and Technologies
Technologies to produce the Home tradable (HT) and the Home non-tradable (HN)
goods are identical:










where θ > 1 and j ∈ {HT,HN}. The coeﬃcient As denotes the labor productivity








s denotes the monopolistic money wage claimed










where Ls is Home aggregate demand for labor. The foreigners share an identical aggre-
gation technology and therefore the corresponding equations apply.
5The notation I stick to throughout this paper is as follows: Superscripts denote where a variable belongs
to, Foreign variables are distinguished by an asterisk ∗. Subscripts identify the characteristics of that variable,
e.g. whether it’s a non-tradable or the Home tradable good.2 THE MODEL 6
The Households
























0 < β < 1, ρ > 0, ν ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The consumption index Ci
s aggregates the Home
non-tradable good Ci
HN,s and tradable goods Ci
T,s with unit elasticity of substitution.
Ci
T,s aggregates the Home tradable good Ci
HT,s and the Foreign tradable good Ci
FT,s with








households have the same preferences over tradable goods but diﬀer with respect to their
own non-tradable good. Hence, the corresponding equations apply.
Individual Wealth and Cash Constraints
Households can trade a nominal bond with other households within a country. They
cannot, however, trade any assets with households from abroad.6 The timing protocol
when asset and goods markets open within a period follows Lucas (1982). At the beginning
of a period s, household i holds nominal wealth Wi
s. In the asset markets, household i
receives money transfers Xi
s, decides about the holding of domestic nominal bonds Bi
s
that repay in next period RsBi
s at a gross nominal return Rs, and about cash holdings
Mi






Thereafter, the goods markets open where purchases of consumption goods must not




At the end of period s, household i receives wage earnings Wi
sLi
s. Thus, the nominal








6This assumption is one of two possible stark assumptions that are suﬃcient for shutting down the current
account which allows the derivation of a closed-form solution. In contrast to the other possible assumption where
international ﬁnancial markets are complete (compare eg. Devereux and Engel (2003)), the lack of international
risk sharing preserves an important role for international monetary policy management: As Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2002a) point out, optimal international monetary policy conduct requires to also take into account the need
for international consumption risk sharing. Since it is a well documented empirical fact that international risk
sharing is indeed incomplete (compare Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996)), the extreme assumption of no international
ﬁnancial markets at all seems to be the more revealing one.
7Note that following Lucas (1982) directly would also imply households to purchase foreign cash within the
asset markets. This, however, is completely equivalent to impose only a single cash constraint since information
is complete at the asset markets. I stick to the single cash constraint because it is assumed that households go
to domestic retailers only who sell both Home and Foreign goods in domestic currency. This also facilitates the
comparison to the standard NOEM approach using money-in-the-utility.2 THE MODEL 7
Optimal Decisions
Households optimize their expected lifetime utility (4) by deciding over bond and cash
holdings, consumption, and their monopolistic wages subject to the constraints (5a-5c),
the demand for their speciﬁc type of labor (2), and subject to the constraint that they have
to set wages one period in advance. In order to smooth consumption over time, household












Individual optimization also yields the standard composition of consumption between
the tradable goods basket and the non-tradable good and between Home and Foreign











FT,s. Overall consumption will be determined by
the household’s cash holding. In particular, we will assume that the net nominal interest
rate will be strictly positive and reaches zero only in the limit. Consequently, the cash
constraint is binding and optimality implies that households use all their initial cash for
consumption goods purchases.8
(Flexible Wages) When the household can set wages instantly, it will equate the real
wage to a mark-up over the marginal rate of substituting consumption and labor (MRS)













The case when wages are ﬂexible will serve as useful benchmark. Equation (7) reveals
that households face two diﬀerent incentives to claim real wages higher than the MRS
would dictate: ﬁrst, wage setters impose a monopolistic mark-up, and second, the cash-in-
advance restriction leads the household to take into account that labor income is available
for consumption only the period thereafter. This is to be evaluated by the nominal interest
rate because the nominal interest rate reﬂects the opportunity cost of holding money as
wealth. Consequently, higher nominal interest rates causes the households to claim higher
money wages.
(Sticky Wages) When wages have to be posted one period in advance, optimal wage
setting requires households to equate the expected marginal loss in utility implied by labor
and the expected marginal gain in utility from the additional consumption purchases the



















as the optimal wage claim. Similar to the case of ﬂexible wages, households impose a
monopolistic mark-up and also take into account the eﬀect of expected nominal interest
rates. With preset wages, however, households cannot adjust their money wage claim
to the realization of shocks. In contrast to the case of ﬂexible wages where households
can eﬀectively control labor eﬀort ex post, ie. after shocks are realized, households are
8As it is well known, the cash-in-advance constraint with the Lucas timing convention of markets is binding
if the net nominal interest rate is positive. In the sticky wage set up, a zero net nominal interest rate implies
real indeterminacy as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) show in a comment to Ireland (1996) for a closed economy.
Nevertheless, we follow Adao et al. (2003) and assume that the interest rate is positive but arbitrarily close to
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assumed to fully supply the amount of labor the ﬁrms demand at the posted money wage.
By the identical structure of the Foreign households’ problem, they obtain equivalent
optimality conditions.
Governments’ Budget Constraints
National monetary authorities change money supply by making direct money transfers to














The money supply will be set according to policy rules that are speciﬁed later in the dis-
cussion of monetary policy conduct. For the Foreign authority the corresponding equation
applies.
3 Equilibrium Allocation
All households within a country are assumed to be identical except for the speciﬁc types
of labor. This also includes that they start out with identical wealth and that they receive
identical money transfers. Thus, by the symmetry of labor demand, all households take
identical optimal decisions. We therefore drop superscript i.
Goods Prices and the Terms of Trade
Goods markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Since goods prices are ﬂexible,
they are set equal to the marginal costs. Consequently, prices of national tradable and
non-tradable goods coincide and the identiﬁcation of whether it is the tradable or non-











respectively. The terms of trade are deﬁned as the price of Home exports over the price






, where Es denotes the nominal exchange rate. In















Ex Post Equilibrium Allocation
As all households within a country take identical decisions and as they start out with
identical initial wealth, they will ask and bid identical amounts of nominal bonds. Thus,
there is no net trade in bonds and asset market clearing conditions require that house-
holds’ bond holding is zero in all states. Consequently, households hold only cash as
wealth, ie. Ws = Ms−1 and W∗
s = M∗
s−1. Next, goods markets clearing of tradable goods3 EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION 9
necessitates nominal imports to equal nominal exports because nominal trade must be
balanced as there are no payments through international ﬁnancial markets. Moreover,
since Home and Foreign households share the same preferences over tradable goods with
unit demand elasticity, purchasing power parity holds for the composite of tradable goods.
As a consequence, Home and Foreign consumption of tradable goods must be the same,
ie. CT,s = C∗
T,s. Making use of the optimal composition of tradable and non-tradable








respectively, reveals that - in terms of tradable goods - Home and Foreign consumption ex-
penditures must be the same. Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a), overall consumption












The immediate equilibrium consequence then is Zs = Z∗
s. Furthermore, money market
clearing and the binding cash-in-advance constraints determine households’ nominal ex-
penditures. Taking ratios of the nominal consumption expenditures and using the goods
market clearing implication of Zs = Z∗
s, one obtains the equilibrium nominal exchange
rate to be solely determined by the ratio of Home and Foreign money supplies. In sum-
mary, independent of whether wages are ﬂexible or preset a period before, the equilibrium
entails
Zs = Z∗





It turns out to be very insightful to express the national variables in terms of their
common and their diﬀerent components as proposed by Aoki (1981). In particular, let
subscript ”w” denote the ”world” average component which is the geometric mean of
Home and Foreign variables and let subscript ”d” denote the ”diﬀerence” component
which is the ratio of Home over Foreign variables.9 The decomposition of Home and
Foreign equilibrium consumption levels yields




The world average consumption which is common to both Home and Foreign is clearly Zs.
As a consequence, in equilibrium, the diﬀerence between Home and Foreign consumption
solely stems from the consumption of non-tradable goods. This is entirely captured by the
real exchange rate and hence by the terms of trade. Consequently, the ex post equilibrium
allocation is uniquely determined for given common consumption level Zs and the terms
of trade ToTs. Table 1 summarizes equilibrium consumption, output and labor.
Flexible Wages














9As a reminder, for Home and Foreign variables X and X∗ the decomposition in levels is X = XwXd and
X∗ = Xw
Xd where Xw = (XX∗)
1
2 and Xd = ( X
X∗)
1
2. The exponents are relative country sizes which in our case
is {1
2,1
2}.3 EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION 10
Table 1
Ex Post period equilibrium allocation for given Z and ToT.
Common World Components Diﬀerence Components
Consumption Cw = Z Cd = ToT −
(1−γ)
2
Output Yw = Z Yd = ToT − 1
2
Labor Lw = A−1
w Z Ld = A
−1
d ToT − 1
2
where X = ν − (1 − ρ) > 0 and Y = ν − (1 − ρ)(1 − γ) > 0. From (15) follows that the
higher the world average nominal interest rates, the lower the common consumption Cw,s.
The reason is well understood: Higher nominal interest rates imply an inﬂation tax on
labor income that increases the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor and the real wage claim. The consequence is an ineﬃciently low
labor supply that results in a reduction of equilibrium output and consumption. The
terms of trade, in turn, depend on relative nominal interest rates as these determine
relative nominal wage levels and thereby relative goods prices. Higher domestic nominal
interest rates cause households to increase their wage claims because they expect higher
inﬂation taxes on labor income. Consequently, goods prices increase and alter the terms
of trade. It is important to observe that it is the relative nominal interest rates that aﬀect
relative prices and the allocation. National money supplies determine only the national
price levels and the nominal exchange rate according to equation (13). When wages are
ﬂexible, the nominal exchange rate does not matter for determining the real allocation.
The role of the money supply changes, however, when wages are sticky.
Sticky Wages
Preset wages imply that goods prices are fully determined by the realization of pro-
ductivity levels. The important implication is that the nominal exchange rate uniquely
determines the terms of trade as by equation (11). Thus Home and Foreign consumption-
based price levels are determined. Home and Foreign consumption levels are therefore
determined by the respective money supplies through the cash-in-advance constraint. As
a result, and in contrast to ﬂexible wages, the ex post real allocation can only be altered










When goods prices are eﬀectively predetermined, world average consumption Zs can only
be changed ex post by altering the common money supply which reﬂects in equilibrium
a one-to-one change in real balances available for consumption purchases. The terms of
trade, in turn, can only be changed ex post by the nominal exchange rate which is deter-
mined by the relative money supplies as in (13).
In fact, this monetary propagation mechanism resembles the standard equilibrium
transmission of monetary policy in NOEM, (compare eg. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001),3 EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION 11
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a), or Devereux and Engel (2003)). In sharp contrast, however,
and key to the analysis in this paper, the money supply is not the only available monetary
instrument to aﬀect the equilibrium allocation. For a more general short-run monetary
policy conduct it is important to realize that even though the ex post allocation can only
be altered by the actual money supply, the expected period nominal interest rates play
a crucial role for the determination of the equilibrium allocation ex ante because they
aﬀect the wage setting and hence the terms of trade ex ante. The argument follows the
same logic as in case of ﬂexible wages: the announced next period’s nominal interest
rates convey the expected inﬂation tax in the following period. Consequently, higher ex
ante expected nominal interest rates lead to higher expected inﬂation taxes the period
thereafter and hence to higher wage claims.10 Recall the optimal wage setting condition
(8).
Digression: Degree of Freedom to Choosing Both the Nominal Interest
Rate and the Money Supply
In order to see that monetary authorities indeed control two separate policy instruments,
note ﬁrst that within a period each level of the nominal interest rate is consistent with a
continuum of that same period’s money supplies. The crucial insight is that in equilibrium,
given the current allocation and given the other country’s monetary policy, the intertem-
poral Euler equation provides national monetary policy with a degree of freedom to pin
down the nominal interest rate because the nominal interest rate relates current money
supply and current consumption to the expected future money growth and to expected
future consumption. This can be seen directly when wages are ﬂexible. From equation
(15) follows that in each instance there are two equations determining the equilibrium
allocation in two unknowns, namely Home and Foreign nominal interest rates. There is
a continuum of money supplies and associated price levels that are consistent with the
equilibrium allocation. Hence, for given current money supply and given future nomi-
nal interest rates, the current nominal interest rate can be controlled by appropriately
announcing future money supplies and thereby the expected future inﬂation.
When wages are preset, things are only slightly more involved. Equation (16) implies
then that the allocation is determined in each period by Home and Foreign money supplies.
As argued above, the nominal interest rates are irrelevant for the current allocation but
they do determine the preset wages given the distribution of future allocations (compare
again the wage setting condition (8)). The question is, however, whether each nominal
interest rate is consistent in the rational expectations equilibrium with a continuum of
current money supplies that determine the current allocation and a continuum of future
money supplies that determine the distribution of future allocations given future nominal
interest rates. The answer is yes and follows in principle the logic of the case when wages
are ﬂexible. Suppose that there are no shocks to the economy and hence all variables take
their expected values. In this case, the allocation is determined as if wages were ﬂexible
and similarly each nominal interest rate is associated with a speciﬁc level of expected
money supply. Consequently, given the current money supply and hence the current
allocation, the nominal interest rate can be eﬀectively chosen by monetary authorities
10Note that in stochastic environments ex post monetary policy conduct also inﬂuences ex ante wage setting
because ex post monetary interventions alter the equilibrium distribution that is relevant for optimal wage
setting. This eﬀect has been emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000, 2002a,b) and comes in addition to the
incentives to alter wages induced by the nominal interest rates. As I argue below, from a welfare perspective,
however, the distribution eﬀects are of second order. In contrast, the eﬀects of the nominal interest rates will
be of ﬁrst order.4 SHORT-RUN MONETARY POLICY 12
through an appropriate change of the expected levels of future money supplies. When
the future states are stochastic, the distribution of the equilibrium allocation around the
expected levels can then be controlled by the distribution of the state-dependent deviations
of the actual money supply from the expected money supply. The expected level of money
supply only aﬀects the expected levels of consumption and inﬂation, not their distribution
around these expected levels. Hence, the period nominal interest rate can bo eﬀectively
controlled by appropriately choosing the expected level of money supply. In principle,
instead of arguing via the nominal interest rate and the money supplies as being the two
separate policy instruments one could also argue via the expected future money supplies
and the state-dependent deviations.11 As a result, monetary authorities thus dispose of
two independent policy instruments - the nominal interest rate and the money supply
- no matter whether wages are ﬂexible or preset. Before we turn to the discussion of
the general short-run monetary policy conduct, we still have to clarify the equilibrium
distribution.
Distribution of the Equilibrium Allocation
Uncertainty stems from productivity shocks that are assumed to be iid log-normal. Letting
lower case letters denote logs, productivity shocks have the following properties: Ea =
Ea∗ = 0 and V ar(a) = V ar(a∗) = σ2
a, where Ea = 0 is assumed for simplicity. In
accordance with the equilibrium variables, these shocks are expressed in terms of a ”world”
component common to both countries and a ”diﬀerence” component making up the gap
in productivity. Thus we have aw,s = 1
2(as + a∗
s) and ad,s = 1
2(as − a∗
s). The distribution
of the decomposed shocks implies in turn
V ar(as) = σ2
a = σ2
aw + σ2
ad since Cov(aw,s,ad,s) = σaw,s,ad,s = 0.
If monetary policies are stationary, iid productivity shocks imply that the households’
and ﬁrms’ optimal decision rules are stationary. As a consequence, the equilibrium of
the inﬁnite horizon setup is simply a repetition of the static version of a single period.
Furthermore, if the money supply is log-normal, too, the distribution of the equilibrium
allocation turns out to be jointly log-normal. Therefore, the solution to the stochastic
general equilibrium can be obtained in closed-form. For the rest of the paper, the time-
subscripts are skipped for convenience.
4 Short-Run Monetary Policy
The key insight of this paper revolves around the question of how policymakers exploit
nominal frictions in diﬀerent strategic settings in order to improve their respective resi-
dent’s economic well-being. In particular, on the one hand, the cash-in-advance require-
ment for goods transactions implies a distorting inﬂation tax on labor income. Thereby,
the monetary authority can inﬂuence workers’ wage setting through the nominal inter-
est rate policy. On the other hand, wage rigidity places the money supply at monetary
authorities’ disposal as an instrument by which it can alter the actual allocation ex post.
As demonstrated above, national monetary authorities can set both the period nom-
inal interest rate and the period money supply independently by steering the expected
money growth rate and the state-dependent deviations from the announced money growth
rate. The important diﬀerence between the two policy instruments is the way the aﬀect
11Compare also the discussions in Ireland (1996) and Adao et al. (2003).4 SHORT-RUN MONETARY POLICY 13
the equilibrium allocation. The money supply management determines state-dependent
spending ﬂows. From an ex ante perspective, this corresponds to changes in the variability
of the equilibrium allocation. The nominal interest rate changes the incentives to workers’
wage setting and thereby the expected equilibrium levels. Crucially then, from a welfare
perspective, the nominal interest rate policy is of ﬁrst order whereas the money supply
management is of second order.
There are yet two other non-monetary frictions in the model economy. The lack of
international risk sharing is an important feature as it reveals important strategic inter-
actions between national monetary authorities. The distortion created by monopolistic
competition is a constant markup over competitive wages which only overlaps with all
other economic eﬀects of interest but which yields no further insights. Therefore I ab-
stract from the distortions created by monopolistic competition and follow Ireland (1996)
by considering the limiting case of perfect competition where θ → ∞ and the wage markup
is unity.12 Moreover, the focus in this paper is not on time-consistency issues. In keeping
with the literature, the attention is restricted to monetary policies to which authorities
can perfectly commit themselves.
Short-Run Monetary Policy Instruments
To be speciﬁc, national monetary authorities’ announce the nominal interest rate and
the feedback rule that conditions the money supply on productivity shocks. The money
supply rules comprise of the feedback coeﬃcients µ = {µaw,µad} and µ∗ = {µ∗
aw,µ∗
ad} and
they are of the form
ˆ m = µawˆ aw + µadˆ ad and ˆ m∗ = µ∗
awˆ aw − µ∗
adˆ ad, (17)
where variables with a hat denote deviations from their expected value. Accordingly, in
(17), ˆ m and ˆ m∗ denote the log-deviation from the expected money supply, ie. ˆ m = m−Em
and ˆ m∗ = m∗ − Em∗. Recall that this speciﬁcation indeed allows the policymakers to
set both the nominal interest rate by choosing the expected values for money supply Em
and Em∗ and the state-dependent deviations ˆ m and ˆ m∗ in order to react to productivity
shocks. Note also that thereby the use of surprise inﬂation is ruled out. The monetary
authorities are committed to these announcements and implement the period monetary
policy accordingly.13
12An alternative assumption is to introduce national ﬁscal stances that subsidize labor in order to oﬀset the
ineﬃcient wage markup. As a matter of fact, in a companion paper I demonstrate that this is indeed part of
the optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in a two-country sticky wage model like the one at hand. However, it is
not necessarily true that non-coordinated ﬁscal policy indeed sets labor income taxes to oﬀset the monopolistic
distortion. Instead, taxes are used to manipulate the terms of trade in exactly the same manner as it turns out
to be the case for the nominal interest rate (see Evers (2007)). Arseneau (2007) studies the role of monopolistic
markups for nominal interest rate policy conduct in open economies in detail.
13Two remarks to the speciﬁcation of the monetary policy are in order: First, as concerning the period single
nominal interest rate, it implies no restriction at all to set it in a non state-contingent way. In case of ﬂexible
wages, it can be demonstrated that even the ex post optimal nominal interest rate is independent of the actual
realization of the state. To be more precise, the polynomial determining the root to the policymaker’s ﬁrst
order condition is linear in the single relevant equilibrium variable consumption. In case of sticky wages, only
the expected nominal interest rate matters. Hence, there is no requirement for state-dependent nominal interest
rate setting, too. For a more detailed discussion, see the Appendix. Second, as concerning the state-dependent
money supply, using the standard feedback rule as eg. in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a) and Devereux and Engel
(2003) would be to take the following AR(1) form: ms = ms−1 + µaw,sˆ aw,s + µad,sˆ ad,s. This, however, implies
Ems = ms−1, which factually precludes the use of both, the nominal interest rate and the money supply as
monetary policy instruments at the same time.4 SHORT-RUN MONETARY POLICY 14
Policymakers’ Objective
The objective of national monetary authorities is to maximize their respective residents’
welfare. By the simpliﬁed iid structure of the model, Home policymaker’s problem reduces
to choose {R,µ} so as to maximize expected period utility EU. The Foreign policymaker
decides over {R∗,µ∗} so as to maximize EU∗. Making use of the equilibrium wage setting,

























respectively. It is important to observe that Home and Foreign policymakers’ objec-
tives are symmetric except for the impact of the terms of trade. Recall from the discussion
of the equilibrium allocation that the diﬀerence between the consumption levels is fully
captured by the terms of trade (compare Table 1). Hence, deviations from the jointly
optimal monetary policy will be solely on the grounds of strategically motivated manip-
ulations of the terms of trade in the respective country’s own favor. Moreover, as the
impacts of the terms of trade on Home and Foreign objectives are orthogonal, the incen-
tives to strategically deviate from the socially optimal policy must necessarily be the kind
of ”beggaring-thy-neighbor”.
The expected utility expressed in the closed-form solution of the equilibrium permits
further insights into the short-run monetary policy conduct as this allows a particularly
convenient separation of the equilibrium implications of monetary policy that directly
aﬀect the average consumption level from the equilibrium implications of monetary policy
that changes the variability of the allocation and hence consumption. It proves illumina-
tive to write expected utility for the ﬂexible wage environment ﬁrst because it is embedded
in the expression of the expected utility under sticky wages.
Flexible Wages



















The term Ωflex summarizes the part of expected utility which depends on uncertainty










In case of ﬂexible wages, all variability of the allocation and hence consumption stems
from exogenous changes in productivity. Importantly, the nominal interest rate determines
the part of expected utility which doesn’t depend on uncertainty but it alters the mean
level of expected utility. The consequence is that as nominal interest rate policy aﬀects
the ﬁrst moment of expected utility, the policy implications are of ﬁrst order.5 OPTIMAL COOPERATIVE MONETARY POLICY 15
Sticky Wages
When wages are sticky, Home expected utility can be decomposed such that it contains
the expression for expected utility under ﬂexible wages,
EU|sticky = Uflex(R;R∗) · exp{Ωsticky(µ;µ∗)}. (20)
Similarly to the above, Ωsticky(µ,µ∗) summarizes the second moment variance and covari-






















where Z = ν −(1−ρ)(1−γ)2 and ω is a constant independent of endogenous variables.14
In contrast to ﬂexible wages where all uncertainty stems from exogenous productivity
disturbances, under preset wages an active state-dependent money supply management
according to the feedback coeﬃcients {µ,µ∗} entails endogenous uncertainty over the
allocation. Crucially, the money supply policy aﬀects the average level of consumption
and hence the expected utility through the changes in the variability of the equilibrium
allocation only. Consequently, and in contrast to the welfare implications of the nominal
interest rate policy, as the money supply policy aﬀects the equilibrium by altering second
moments of the equilibrium distribution of the allocation, the welfare implications are
thus of second order. Because the importance of the diﬀerent implications of the two
monetary policy instruments on expected utility cannot be overemphasized, the discussion
is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The welfare implications of short-run nominal interest rate policy are of
ﬁrst-order whereas the welfare implications of short-run money supply management are of
second-order.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shall constitute the backbone of the argument put forth in this analysis.
By the discussion in the beginning, the literature on international monetary policy regimes
has largely focused on stabilization issues. Gains from policy coordination, however, are
quantiﬁed to be fairly small. Relating to the discussion in Lucas (2003), gains from
stabilization and thereby gains from international coordination of stabilization policies
are generically quite limited as they are of second order. On the contrary, the nominal
interest rate policy as discussed here means that monetary authorities exploit the inﬂation
tax to govern the workers’ wage setting. In terms of Lucas, this denotes a supply side
eﬀect which is of ﬁrst order. Consequently, from a quantitative perspective, welfare gains
from international coordination of nominal interest rate policies are to be expected of an
order of magnitude larger than welfare gains from coordinating monetary stabilization
policy as it has been done in the past. A numerical example shall support this claim.
Next, however, the analysis is continued with a discussion of the theoretical results of
optimal coordinated and noncooperative international policy conduct.
5 Optimal Cooperative Monetary Policy
When national policymakers coordinate their respective monetary policies, they do so as
to maximize the sum of the equally weighted Home and Foreign residents’ welfare.
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The Optimal Nominal Interest Rate
The globally optimal interest rate policy is as follows.
Proposition 2. The optimal nominal interest rate policy is to follow the Friedman rule,
ie.
ROpt = 1,
and R∗Opt = ROpt by symmetry.
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimality of the Friedman rule is well understood.15 The intuition for this result
can be best seen in the context of optimal taxation since it is an immediate implication
of the optimal taxation principle (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)) which postulates not to
tax intermediate inputs. Recall that as labor income is available for consumption only
the following period, the gross nominal interest rate reﬂects the intertemporal nominal
cost of keeping labor income as cash that cannot be spent within the sam period as when
it is earned. This can then be understood as a tax on labor income and thus as a tax on
an intermediate input to the production of goods. As a consequence, it is optimal to set
the net nominal interest rate to zero and thereby to oﬀset the implicit tax on labor input.
Importantly, the optimality of the Friedman rule obtains for both environments, with
ﬂexible wages as well as sticky wages. When wages are ﬂexible, a positive net nominal
interest rate leads to a distortive wedge between the marginal rate of substituting labor
and consumption (MRS) on the one hand and marginal product of labor (MPL) on the
other hand in all instances. When wages are sticky, labor is demand determined and the
ratio between MRS and MPL is not necessarily at an ineﬃciently high level. However,
expected utility is maximized when the distortion is minimized on average. Hence, the
Friedman rule is optimal under sticky wages, too.
The Optimal Money Supply
In contrast to the nominal interest rate, money supply is allocatively eﬀective only when
wages are sticky. In the discussion of monetary policy instruments, the bottom line was
that the money supply management aﬀects the variability of the equilibrium allocation.
As an immediate consequence, the two relevant frictions that impose distortions to the
equilibrium allocation which could be on target for the money supply are wage rigidity and
the lack of international asset markets. The next proposition states the optimal feedback
coeﬃcients on aggregate and asymmetric productivity shocks.
















ad by symmetry. Furthermore, with µFlex as the









ad if ρ > 1 and 0 < γ < 1,
< µFlex
ad if ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1,
= µFlex





15See eg. Chari et al. (1996), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Adao et al. (2003), or Kocherlakota (2005) for closed
economy setups and Cooley and Quadrini (2003) and Arseneau (2007) in the context of open economies.5 OPTIMAL COOPERATIVE MONETARY POLICY 17
Proof. See Appendix.
In case of aggregate productivity shocks, the only distortion that matters stems from
preset wages. The optimal money supply response is then to replicate the ﬂexible wage
allocation. To be more precise, in case of ﬂexible wages it easy to see that the intra-
temporal substitution elasticity of consumption and labor is
1−ρ
ν . When wages are preset,
labor is fully demand determined and hence uncoupled from the consumption decision.
As a consequence, in order to mimic the optimal labor-consumption trade-oﬀ, the op-
timal money supply response to aggregate productivity shocks adjusts real balances so
that consumption and labor changes in the right proportion. To be speciﬁc, consider
a positive aggregate productivity shock. If wages were ﬂexible, households’ would raise
nominal wages up to the point where real wages would equal the marginal rate of sub-
stituting labor and consumption (see equation 7). For ρ > 1 consumption and labor are
substitutes and hence households increase consumption and also reduce labor in response
to a rise in real labor income. Under sticky wages, this adjustment is not possible. The
positive aggregate productivity shock leads ceteris paribus to a one-to-one drop in goods
prices and thereby to a one-to-one increase in consumption whereas employment stays
unaﬀected. As a result, the optimal response of monetary policy must be to dampen the
increase of consumption by contracting the money supply. This leads to a reduction of
equilibrium employment, too, and thereby the optimal consumption-labor ratio can be
restored. In contrast, if ρ < 1, consumption and labor are complements and optimality
requires a conjoint increase in labor and consumption. As a consequence, money supply
must respond pro-cyclically. In case of log-utility, ie. ρ = 1, it is optimal that labor
doesn’t respond to consumption ﬂuctuations at all. The optimality of targeting the ﬂexi-
ble wage allocation reproduces the ﬁndings of several recent contributions where wage or
price rigidity prevents the equilibrium allocation from eﬃciency.16
In case of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the lack of international risk sharing
comes in addition to the ineﬃciency caused by preset wages. Complete asset markets
would enable Home and Foreign households to contract state-contingent payments in
order to insure against all idiosyncratic risks. The consequence of perfect consumption risk
sharing for the initially identical countries would be that for all goods the ratio of Home
and Foreign marginal consumption utilities equals the ratio of the respective equilibrium
goods prices (compare, for example, Backus and Smith (1993)). In particular, for the
basket of tradable goods the implication is that the ratio of Home over Foreign marginal




= 1. In terms of the equilibrium without asset markets,









decreases in response to, for example, a terms of trade depreci-
ation if ρ > 1 and the ratio increases if ρ < 1. The intuition is best captured in terms
of substitutability and complementarity of consumption goods in the Edgworth-Pareto
sense.17 If ρ > 1, the diﬀerent consumption goods are substitutes. A terms of trade
16Examples for closed economies can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), Goodfriend and
King (1997), Erceg et al. (2000), or Adao et al. (2003). For open economies, compare Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2002a), Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006), or Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
17Two goods are substitutes (complements) in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense if the marginal utility of one good
is decreasing (increasing) with the consumption of the other good. For open economy setups, see also Svensson
(1987) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).6 NONCOOPERATIVE MONETARY POLICY 18
depreciation caused by a positive Home productivity shock leads households to substi-
tute the costlier Foreign goods for the cheaper Home goods. Thereby, Home households
consume more Home tradables and non-tradables whereas Foreign households consume
less Foreign tradables and non-tradables. In equilibrium, however, it is that Home and
Foreign households consume the same amount of tradables, ie. CT = C∗
T. As a con-
sequence, the diﬀerence in marginal utilities of tradable goods consumption necessarily
stems from the diﬀerence in consumption of non-tradables: Home households consume too
much tradables relative to non-tradables as risk sharing would imply, Foreign households
consume too less tradables relative to non-tradables as risk sharing would imply. The ap-
propriate money supply change to oﬀset this eﬀect is to make Home households pay more
for Foreign tradable goods and thereby to make them paying more for overall tradable
goods and to make Foreign households pay less for Home tradables and thereby to make
them paying less for overall tradable goods. Hence, to attenuate the lack of risk sharing,
optimal money supply necessitates an depreciating of Home nominal exchange rate. For
ρ < 1, when consumption goods are complements, the according logic applies. In this case,
however, it is that Home households consume too less tradables relative to non-tradables
whereas Foreign households consume too much tradables relative to non-tradables than
under perfect risk sharing. The optimal money supply management therefore leads to an
appreciation of Home nominal exchange rate in order to make Home households pay less
for Foreign goods and to make Foreigners pay more for Home goods.
To see that there is in general a conﬂict of closing the domestic gaps between the
marginal rate of substituting consumption and labor on the one hand and closing the
international gap between Home and Foreign marginal consumption utilities on the other
hand, suppose that Home and Foreign monetary authorities target the ﬂexible wage allo-
cation and implement µad
flex = µ∗
ad
flex. This policy response, however, never fully oﬀsets
the impact of asymmetric productivity shocks on the terms of trade, ie. c tot = − ν
Yˆ ad. Con-
sequently, by the logic developed above, monetary authorities face an incentive also to
attenuate the implications of the lack of international consumption risk sharing.18 More-
over, the trade-oﬀ between targeting the two distortions is characterized by a more active
response when money supply management targets the ﬂexible wage allocation than it is
optimal. To prevent a repetition of arguments, however, a discussion is left to the reader.
The importance of this trade-oﬀ is also discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a).
6 Noncooperative Monetary Policy
In the discussion of national policymakers’ objectives, the central message is captured
by Proposition 1: The nominal interest rate policy has ﬁrst-order welfare implications
whereas the money supply policy implications are of second order. Consequently, the
losses from not coordinating monetary policy are of ﬁrst-order when national monetary
authorities face the incentive to deviate from the jointly beneﬁcial Friedman rule (Propo-
sition 2). In this section it is shown that self-oriented national policymakers follow the
Friedman rule if and only if the two countries are closed. As long as there are trade link-
ages between the two countries, the incentives to manipulate the terms of trade cause the
policymakers to unilaterally deviate from the optimal cooperative solution. Thereby, the
18There are three special cases where no such trade-oﬀ exists: When i) ρ = 1, the intertemporal and the
intratemporal substitution elasticities coincide and hence risk is fully diversiﬁed via goods consumption in
market equilibrium; when ii) γ = 1, only tradable goods are consumed and hence CT = C∗
T directly implies
perfect consumption risk sharing; and when iii) γ = 0, no tradable goods are demanded at all and therefore the
only ineﬃciency that is prevailing is wage stickiness.6 NONCOOPERATIVE MONETARY POLICY 19
gains from cooperation that are forgone if national monetary authorities act independently
are of ﬁrst order.
The Nominal Interest Rate
The following proposition establishes that the nominal interest rate in a Nash equilibrium
of the policy setting game in general diﬀers from the cooperative nominal interest rate.
Proposition 4. The unique Nash equilibrium of non-cooperatively set nominal interest
rates implies
RNash = 1 +
γX
Y + (1 − γ)X
,
and R∗Nash = RNash by symmetry. Furthermore,
RNash > ROpt for γ 6= 0 and RNash = ROpt iﬀ γ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this ﬁnding is straight forward: policymakers face the incentive to
improve their respective households’ consumption-labor trade-oﬀ. If there are any trade
linkages between the two countries, ie. if γ > 0, the non-cooperative solution prescribes the
policymakers to induce workers to claim higher wages by raising the nominal interest rate
and consequently the implicit tax on labor. For instance, given Foreign wages and goods
prices, an increase in Home wages imply an appreciation of the Home’s terms of trade. In
equilibrium, this causes a fall in labor demand: ﬁrst, higher wage claims lead to a direct
fall in Home labor demand. Second, the increase in the Home’s relative prices induces a
reduction of the demand for Home goods. As a consequence, both Home labor demand
and labor income falls. Foreign households, however, have to give more of their goods
in exchange for Home goods. This yields ceteris paribus a higher Home consumption-
labor ratio and thereby higher welfare. As a result, domestic policymakers ”beggar-thy-
neighbor” by inducing the Foreign households to work more and thus to worsen Foreign
consumption-labor trade-oﬀ. In the symmetric equilibrium, the consequence are higher
distortive Home and Foreign nominal interest rates that reduce aggregate output and
thereby aggregate consumption as labor is supplied at an ineﬃciently low level. Again,
this holds true for both environments: for ﬂexible wages in all instances and under sticky
wages on average.
Importantly, the incentive to unilaterally deviate from the globally optimal Friedman
rule is increasing with the degree of openness. That is, the larger the economic interde-
pendence through trade linkages between the two countries, the higher is the incentive
to ”beggar-thy-neighbor” and to unilaterally manipulate the terms of trade by increasing
the domestic interest rate. As the welfare implications are of ﬁrst-order, the consequences
of the failure to cooperate on the nominal interest rates become more severe the more
interdependent the countries are.
The Money Supply
The next Proposition shows the equilibrium money supply when national policymakers
act independently.7 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 20
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ad if ρ > 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
> µ
Opt
ad if ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
= µ
Opt
ad if ρ = 1 or γ ∈ {0,1} .
Proof. See Appendix.
Not surprisingly, in case of aggregate productivity shocks, the Nash solution does not
diﬀer from the optimal solution. Aggregate shocks shift consumption expenditures in a
way that is common to both countries. Therefore, the policy targets coincide. Why,
however, is it that national policymakers do not use aggregate productivity shocks as a
stochastic anchor to manipulate the terms of trade? Indeed, they face the incentive to
do so. Nevertheless, the only friction that prevents from individual optimality is wage
rigidity. Therefore, the only incentive to manipulate the terms of trade is to achieve the
optimal consumption-labor trade-oﬀ. Hence, the optimal policy response to aggregate
productivity shocks also solves the Nash problem.
This is no longer the case for asymmetric productivity shocks. As laid out above,
optimal cooperative money supply management faces a trade-oﬀ between targeting the
domestic gap between the marginal rate of substituting consumption and labor and the
international gap between Home and Foreign marginal consumption utilities. Proposition
5 shows that as long as imperfect international risk sharing is a matter of concern, ie.
as long as ρ 6= 1 or 0 < γ < 1, both single national monetary authorities unilaterally
deviate from the jointly optimal response and thereby from the optimal trade-oﬀ. The
reason is again that self-oriented policymakers try to rather close the domestic gap to
improve the domestic consumption-labor trade-oﬀ. In fact, in the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, authorities set money supply to react more actively to idiosyncratic shocks
than it is globally eﬃcient. Hence, from the discussion of the optimal trade-oﬀ follows
that non-cooperative policymakers attach more value to targeting the domestic gap at the
expense of a widening of the international gap. The immediate consequence is that the
unilateral deviation ”beggars-thy-neighbor”.
7 A Numerical Example
A numerical example shall illustrate the quantitative importance of international mone-
tary policy cooperation and evaluate the diﬀerent welfare implication of the nominal inter-
est rate policy and the money supply management. To keep the comparison to the litera-
ture simple, I take parameters values from Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a): σaw = σad = 0.01
and ν = 1. Moreover, two possible trade scenarios are considered: a low-trade scenario
(γ = 0.2) which corresponds to an import over GDP ratio of 10% and high-trade scenario
(γ = 0.6) which corresponds to an import over GDP ratio of 30%.7 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 21
Table 2
Gains from International Monetary Policy Coordination.
Low-trade scenario (γ = 0.2) High-trade scenario (γ = 0.6)
Diﬀerent values for ρ Diﬀerent values for ρ
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8 ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8
Welfare Measure (compensating % change in consumption)a
ξR 1.674 0.537 0.155 0.042 0.011 11.566 5.831 2.378 0.811 0.243
ξM 0.151 0 0.062 0.158 0.229 0.007 0 0.006 0.019 0.037
ξ 1.827 0.537 0.217 0.200 0.240 11.574 5.831 2.384 0.830 0.280
a Following Lucas (1987, 2003), ξ denotes the percentage compensation of consumption so that
U((1 + ξ)CA,LA) = U(CB,LB), where A and B are two diﬀerent policies. Moreover, the
decomposition of the equilibrium welfare yields the measure ξR for the welfare implication
of diﬀerent nominal interest rates and ξM for diﬀerent money supply managements.
The gains from international monetary policy coordination are reported in Table 2. For
varying values of ρ, three numbers are stated: ξ denotes the necessary percentage increase
in consumption so that households are indiﬀerent between international monetary policy
coordination and independent policy conduct. By the structure of the model, the overall
measure can be further decomposed into ξR for nominal interest rate policy and ξM for
money supply management.
Independent of the degree of openness γ, welfare gains from coordinating the nominal
interest rate are decreasing in ρ. For larger values of ρ, the inter-temporal substitution
elasticity is decreasing. Consequently, as households attach greater importance to actual
consumption, the higher non-cooperative nominal interest rate and hence the intertempo-
ral costs of holding labor income as cash doesn’t preponderate too much. Importantly, the
gains are, however, increasing in the extend to which the two countries are linked through
trade. Clearly, the more important the terms of trade are for domestic households, the
more prone are domestic policymakers to manipulate relative nominal goods prices in or-
der to make national residents better oﬀ. In contrast, welfare gains from coordinating the
money supply management are increasing in absolute deviation of ρ from unity because
thereby the consequences of the lack of international risk sharing are more pronounced.
Gains are, however, smaller in the high-trade scenario because international consumption
risk sharing is achieved to a larger extend through international trade on goods markets
and consequently the relative importance of attenuating the lack of international asset
markets is decreasing.
Notably, as already indicated by Proposition 1, since the nominal interest rate eﬀects
are of ﬁrst order, welfare gains are of ﬁrst order. In the high-trade scenario, gains from
coordinating the nominal interest rate are up to 4 orders of magnitude larger than gains
from coordinating macroeconomic stabilization through money supplies. These results
are consistent on the one hand with the broad literature on policy coordination that
concentrated on stabilization issues as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002a), Pappa (2004), and8 CONCLUSION 22
Canzoneri et al. (2005), and on the other hand with the very recent considerations of the
optimal nominal interest rate policy in open economies in Cooley and Quadrini (2003)
and Arseneau (2007).
8 Conclusion
Within the large body of the literature on international monetary policy coordination,
the broad consensus is that gains from policy coordination are small if not negligible.
This view is corroborated by theoretical considerations that focus on the coordination of
international monetary stabilization policies. While all these contributions deserve their
very merits for revealing important insights, the ﬁnding that the quantitative importance
is fairly small is not surprising: stabilization policies target the variability of the allocation
and monetary policy focuses on short-run demand side management. They are hence
generically of second order. However, to plagiarize Lucas (2003), the ”potential for welfare
gains from better long-run, supply side policies exceeds by far the potential from further
improvements in short-run demand management”.
The contribution of the present paper is to take up this proposition and introduce it
into the context of international monetary policy coordination. The arguments made are
formalized within a simple dynamic stochastic two-country model with preset wages and
cash-in-advance restrictions. In this environment, monetary authorities can manipulate
the terms of trade by conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the
nominal interest rate and the money supply. On the one hand, money supply aﬀects the
allocation and the terms of trade ex post by altering relative nominal spending and thereby
the nominal exchange rate. In this respect, monetary policy is used in the traditional way
so as to stabilize macroeconomic ﬂuctuations by ﬁne tuning spending ﬂows. On the other
hand, the nominal interest rate aﬀects the allocation and the terms of trade ex ante
by altering the households’ wage setting conditions and thereby goods prices. In this
respect, monetary policy changes the incentives to work and might cause ineﬃciencies
on the supply side. It is demonstrated that the resulting welfare implications of nominal
interest rate policy are of ﬁrst order whereas the welfare implications of money supply
management are of second order.
The important consequence - and the central message of this analysis - is that gains
from coordinating money supply management are generically of second order if they focus
on stabilization issues. In contrast, gains from preventing excessively high nominal interest
rates resulting from self-interested strategic manipulations of the terms of trade are of ﬁrst
order and hence expected to be of higher orders of magnitude. A numerical example of the
simple model already indicates that welfare gains from globally optimal monetary policy
conduct might be substantial. The present analysis of a more general monetary policy
conduct in interdependent economies hence leads to the conclusion that gains from policy
coordination might have been to a large extend underestimated.
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